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Abstract
The idea that banks exist to reduce the costs of monitoring is central to modern
theories of financial intermediation.  The fact that banks are generally granted senior
positions on their small-business loans, however, is hard to reconcile with the typical
view that junior lenders have the best incentives to engage in this costly monitoring.  Our
paper addresses this puzzling contradiction by showing that bank seniority plays an
important role in encouraging the formation of valuable bank-firm relationships.
The intuition behind our model lies in the fact that once the firm’s prospects have
deteriorated, junior creditors have incentives much like those of the firm’s shareholders.
Thus, it is the most senior claimant that benefits from helping the firm improve its
quality.  If banks are made junior to other creditors, they benefit little from additional
investment in the firm during times of poor performance and hence will have little
incentive to build relationships that enable them to determine the value of such an
investment. As a result, making the bank senior improves its incentives to build a
relationship with the firm, thereby fulfilling an important function of intermediated debt.Relationship Lending and Bank Seniority
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1.  Introduction
The idea that banks exist to reduce the monitoring costs associated with external
finance is central to modern theories of financial intermediation.
1  Rather than having
multiple lenders collect information about the firm’s prospects prior to granting credit
and then simultaneously monitor the borrower’s actions once an investment has been
undertaken, potential investors may find it more efficient to delegate these tasks to a
“bank,” through which they all provide funding to the firm.
This role for bank lending is particularly important for small-business borrowers,
whose small size and relative opacity make funding through public markets a virtual
impossibility, and leads naturally into the idea of banks as “relationship lenders.”
Through their ongoing monitoring efforts, banks build relationships with their customers
that give them valuable information about these firms’ prospects in the future.
2
Of course, financial intermediaries are not without incentive problems of their
own.  In particular, a bank may shirk on its ongoing obligation to build monitoring
relationships with the firms in which it has invested.  One way of resolving this problem
is to make the bank junior to the firm’s other creditors; since it will be the first to suffer
any losses if the firm misbehaves, the junior bank will have a better incentive to perform
its ongoing monitoring function.
3  This “solution,” however, contrasts starkly with the
fact that bank loans are usually senior to those of other creditors, especially when the
borrower is a small business for whom such monitoring is so important.  This raises an
important question:  Why are bank loans senior to other debt claims?
                                                
1 Leland and Pyle (1977), Diamond (1984), Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984) and Boyd and Prescott
(1986).  See Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) and Freixas and Rochet (1997) for reviews of the
contemporary banking literature.
2 Berlin (1996) provides a nice expositional introduction to the notion of relationship lending we consider
in this paper.  Boot and Thakor (1994) show that, even without learning, a long-term bank-borrower
relationship is still welfare improving because it allows the bank to reduce the use of (costly) collateral in
the financing contract over time.  See Ongena and Smith (1998) for a review of the literature on
relationship lending.
3 See, for example, Fama (1990).Relationship Lending and Bank Seniority
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In this paper, we address this question by showing that bank seniority plays an
important role in encouraging the formation of ongoing bank-firm relationships,
improving banks’ incentives to monitor their borrowers.  If banks are made junior to
other creditors, they may benefit little in bad states from additional investment in the
firm, and hence will have little incentive to build a relationship that might allow them to
determine the value of such an investment.
4  As a result, the first contribution of our
paper is to show that making the bank senior improves its incentives to build a
relationship with the firm.
Central to our model is the idea that banks are important to small-business
borrowers because they can develop ongoing relationships that help them understand a
firm’s true quality in bad states of nature.  In good states of the world, having a
relationship with a bank is not particularly important to a firm, because many lenders will
be willing to provide funding even without special knowledge of the firm’s prospects.  In
contrast, during a recession firms that have ongoing relationships with a bank are better
able to obtain additional financing, allowing them to weather the recession with minimal
loss.  Firms that do not have bank relationships, however, may find the terms of such
supplemental financing too onerous.  Consequently, their prospects diminish.
5
Our paper’s second major contribution is to show how the bank’s ability to cross-
subsidize the firm over different stages of its development can play a key role in enabling
it to build a relationship with the firm.  The monitoring activities associated with building
a relationship with the firm can be extremely costly for the bank.  As a result, it will often
                                                
4 This result is somewhat different from the more typical assumption that junior creditors have a better
incentive to monitor the firm.  The distinction here lies in our assumption that the bank’s monitoring
becomes valuable only in a recession, when junior creditors may have incentives more closely aligned with
those of the firm’s owner.  We discuss this further in Section 7.
5 Slovin, Sushka, and Polonchek (1993), Petersen and Rajan (1994), and Berger and Udell (1995), among
others, report results supporting the claim that a close relationship with a bank is valuable to small firms.
Ongena and Smith (forthcoming) present evidence from several countries on the number of bank
relationships that firms choose.  Williams Stanton (1998) argues that banks reduce their lending to
creditworthy firms during recessions, contributing to credit crunches.  This behavior is not inconsistent
with our results, which simply depend on the notion that firms with ongoing bank relationships have better
access to credit during recessions than firms without such relationships.Relationship Lending and Bank Seniority
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be impossible for the bank to be fully compensated for these costs in its initial loan
agreement with the firm.  In our model, however, the bank’s ability to earn super-normal
returns in a future debt agreement allows it to credibly commit to performing these tasks,
even though the expected return on its initial loan with the firm may be negative.
It is a generally accepted fact that bank debt is typically senior to that of other
creditors, particularly for small-business borrowers.  Mann (1997) and Schwartz (1997)
paint pictures of banks as not only taking a senior claim over other creditors, but also
collateralizing as much of their debt as possible and incorporating protective covenants
that restrict the firm’s ability to undertake additional debt without the bank’s permission.
6
In addition, Carey (1995) finds that a large majority of bank-debt loan agreements with
large firms contain a senior priority clause, regardless of whether or not the borrower has
public debt outstanding.
Ours is not the first effort to explain the ubiquity of bank seniority.  Building on
Diamond (1993a), Diamond (1993b) argues that making short-term (bank) debt senior
relative to long-term (public) debt improves the bank’s incentives to monitor and
liquidate the borrower if it gets into financial distress.  Berglöf and von Thadden (1994),
Park (1997), and Repullo and Suarez (1998) also focus on the liquidation problem and
arrive at similar conclusions.  Welch (1997) argues that banks are typically senior vis-à-
vis the firm’s other creditors because they are better negotiators in financial distress.  In
general, Welch argues, banks are better organized than other creditors, and have more to
gain from developing a reputation as a tough negotiator in bankruptcy proceedings.  By
making the “stronger” creditor (the bank) senior, the firm is able to reduce costly
conflicts among creditors that arise in financial distress.
In contrast to these papers, we focus on the problem of small-business borrowers
that do not have access to public capital markets and for whom gathering information
                                                
6 Mann argues, however, that banks’ use of collateral with small businesses is declining.  Nevertheless, his
evidence is consistent with the overall conclusion that banks overwhelmingly take senior positions in their
small-business loans.Relationship Lending and Bank Seniority
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about their projects is expensive.  This focus is important because such firms rely much
more heavily on banks for loans and their ability to reduce monitoring costs.  To our
knowledge, ours is the first model to analyze the seniority question for this important
subset of the loan market.
Our model is most similar to those of Diamond (1993b) and Rajan (1992).  Both
of these models involve a firm balancing the use of long-term (public) debt and short-
term (bank) debt in order to ensure the correct liquidation/continuation decision once
information about its prospects is revealed.  In Diamond, the bank makes better
liquidation decisions when it is senior, since the proceeds from such liquidations do not
flow through to the firm’s bondholders.  In contrast, Rajan argues that bank debt should
be junior to the firm’s public debt.  This difference arises because Rajan assumes that the
bank’s relationship with the firm gives it an informational advantage over other potential
creditors:  “If the bank has higher priority, it can dispossess the arm’s-length creditor,
giving the bank an incentive to avoid liquidation” (Rajan, 1992, p. 1387).
Like Diamond, we find that the bank and the firm have a better incentive to make
Pareto-preferred decisions when the bank is senior.  As in Rajan, however, the bank in
our model may earn monopoly rents from its renegotiation with the firm once it learns
about the firm’s future prospects.  Indeed, the ability to capture such rents plays a central
role in encouraging the bank to build a relationship with the firm.
7
A fundamental difference between our paper and these lies in our assumption that
the process of building a relationship and monitoring the firm is costly for the bank.  As a
result, the bank’s contract must provide it with the proper incentive to actually incur these
costs and build a relationship with the firm.  Another important distinction between our
paper and Rajan is that we model firm effort as increasing the expected value of the
firm’s revenues to be divided in renegotiation.  In contrast, firm effort in Rajan increases
the likelihood that renegotiation will occur, but not the “size of the pie” to be split.  It is
                                                
7 See also Peterson and Rajan (1995) and Boot and Thakor (forthcoming) for analyses of the effects of
competition on relationship lending.Relationship Lending and Bank Seniority
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this difference in the effects of firm effort, as well as our incorporation of relationship-
building costs, that explains the dichotomy between our results and Rajan’s.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows.  The next section introduces a
model of bank relationship lending.  In Section 3, we define a relationship equilibrium
and derive plausible conditions under which such an equilibrium exists only when the
bank is senior.  Section 4 discusses alternative equilibria, and demonstrates that our
relationship equilibrium Pareto dominates these other alternatives.  Section 5 examines
the impact of the relative bargaining strengths of the bank and the firm on the outcome in
our model.  In Section 6, we outline the direct empirical implications that arise from our
model, while Section 7 concludes.  Proofs of all results are found in the Appendix.
2.  A Model of Relationship Lending
We consider the problem of a firm that must borrow funds in order to invest in a
project.  Prior to its maturity, however, outside shocks may occur that can affect the
“quality” of this project.  The precise impact of these shocks depends on the effort the
entrepreneur has exerted prior to the onset of the shock and on whether the bank
advances additional funds to the firm.
For firms whose entrepreneurs have exerted a great deal of effort, a recession
leads only to a liquidity crunch.  In this case, the firm must receive additional financing
or its project will deteriorate.  If it does receive this funding, however, its project
continues as if no recession had occurred.
In contrast, if the entrepreneur does not exert effort, additional investment has no
effect on the expected value of the firm’s project.  Instead, a low-effort firm that invests
during a recession actually makes its project more risky.  We think of this as a “going for
broke” strategy:  Since the firm did not exert any effort, there is no way for it to regain its
high-return, low-risk status.
The final element of our story is the bank’s decision to build a costly relationship
with the firm.  We assume that this relationship is important in that it allows the bank toRelationship Lending and Bank Seniority
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determine if the entrepreneur exerted effort.  As a result, when the bank has a relationship
with a firm, it is able to tell whether that firm is requesting additional investment because
of a liquidity shock—a high-effort entrepreneur—or if it will use these added funds to go
for broke—a low-effort entrepreneur.  Without a relationship, however, the bank is
unable to tell which type of firm is requesting additional funds and is hence less willing
to advance these funds.
To this end, consider a two-period model in which an entrepreneur can invest I in
a project in period 0 that will provide a random return in period 2.  Since the entrepreneur
has no initial endowment, he must obtain funds from outside sources in order to
undertake his project.  Figure 1 depicts the order of events in our model.
We assume that the entrepreneur obtains funds from two different sources.  The
first is a bank.  In our model, banks are special in that they provide funding to meet the
firm’s general liquidity needs on an ongoing basis.  In the process of providing such
funds, banks are able to develop relationships with entrepreneurs, relationships that are
valuable in a way to be specified in a moment.  The second lender can be thought of as a
trade creditor.  We think of trade creditors as companies such as the firm’s suppliers for
whom lending is an ancillary activity to their primary business of producing goods.  As a
consequence, the trade creditor is unable to provide the firm with general cash infusions.
For example, if a firm requires a working-capital loan to meet its payroll, such funds
would come from its bank, not a trade creditor.
8  Both lenders provide the entrepreneur
with funds in period 0 with the promise that they will be repaid with the revenue earned
in period two.  Let  B I  denote the funds borrowed from a bank and  T I  the funds borrowed
from a trade creditor, where  I I I T B = + .
9
                                                
8 Boot and Thakor (forthcoming) distinguish between “relationship loans” and “transaction loans,”
otherwise known as arms-length lending.  Applying this terminology to our model, banks make relationship
loans while trade creditors offer transaction loans because they do not provide relationship services to the
firm.
9 In this paper, we follow Diamond (1993b) and Welch (1997) and simply take it as given that the
entrepreneur borrows funds from two different lenders.  In another paper (in progress), we show how
differences in the valuation of a firm’s various assets can endogenously lead firms to borrow from multiple
sources.  See Berglöf and von Thadden (1994) and Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) for other models thatRelationship Lending and Bank Seniority
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Immediately after these loans are made, the bank decides whether or not to invest
in building a relationship with the borrower; if it does so, the bank incurs a cost  B c .  We
think of building a relationship as involving regular visits with the entrepreneur to learn
about his business and his customers.  This ongoing monitoring is particularly important
for the smaller, younger firms we consider in this paper, since their prospects can change
much more quickly than those of larger, more-established enterprises.  Because of the
ongoing nature of this process, the bank cannot build its relationship with the firm prior
to its funding decision, nor can it credibly commit to actually following through with a
promise to build a relationship once it provides funding to the firm.
10
The “hands-on” nature of this relationship building allows entrepreneurs to
observe whether a relationship is being developed.  Based on this information, the
entrepreneur then decides whether or not to exert effort in his firm; doing so costs him
E c .
The expected return of the firm’s project in period 2 depends on several factors.
First, it is affected by exogenous market factors, the “state of the world,” which is
realized in period 1 (after the bank and firm have decided whether to build a relationship
and exert effort).  With probability θ  the good state occurs, and the firm’s project
continues with no modification; we will call the project in this state of the world project
G.  Note that in the good state, neither the entrepreneur’s effort nor the bank’s
relationship has any effect on the project.
In contrast, in the bad state of the world, which occurs with probability  θ − 1 ,
additional investment can affect the project’s outcome.  We think of this event as a
“recession,” and it affects high-effort and low-effort firms differently.
11  If the
entrepreneur exerted effort, he can retain his original project G only if he can raise an
                                                                                                                                                
endogenize the use of multiple creditors.
10 This is not to suggest that the bank might not also monitor the firm’s quality prior to making a funding
decision.
11 We use the term recession for expositional convenience.  Our paper does not consider any aggregate
implications and the use of this term is not intended to suggest otherwise.Relationship Lending and Bank Seniority
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additional  1 I  from the bank.
12  Otherwise, his project deteriorates to project B.  We
assume that project B has the same risk as project G, but that its expected return is
lower.
13  If the entrepreneur did not exert effort in period 0, additional investment in the
bad state has a different effect.  In this case, if the entrepreneur invests an additional I1,
the project’s risk increases, while its mean remains low, as in project B.  We will denote
this project as project R.  In either case, if the entrepreneur requests additional funding
from the bank, we assume that renegotiations proceed according to rules we will outline
below.
In period 2 the project matures.  We distinguish among projects G, B, and R using
two parameters, µ  and σ .  The parameter µ  measures the difference in the expected
return across projects, while σ  is a measure of a project’s risk.
14  A project is assumed to
be successful with probability  ) (σ p , in which case it produces  ) ( σ µ + X ; with
probability  ) ( 1 σ p −  it “fails,” producing  ) ( σ µ − x , where  x X ≥ .
We assume that increases in σ  are mean preserving, so that for any  1 σ and  2 σ ,
) )]( ( 1 [ ) )( ( ) )]( ( 1 [ ) )( ( 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ − − + + = − − + + ≡ Γ x p X p x p X p . (1)
In this specification, a project with a larger σ  has more risk; that is, we assume
0 ) ( < ′ σ p .
15  Notice that an increase in the risk of a project has two effects.  First, it
reduces the probability that the project succeeds.  Second, it increases the payoff of the
project when it is successful and reduces its payoff when it fails.  Figure 2 shows the
impact of a change in σ  on the probability density function of a project’s return.  The
advantage of this specification is that it allows us to independently examine the impact of
changes in the net present value of the project and its risk, while maintaining the
analytical simplicity of a two-point return distribution.
                                                
12 Hart and Moore (1998) model a situation in which a borrower may wish to obtain excess financing in
period 0 in order to avoid refinancing concerns in period 1.  Such a strategy would be sub-optimal in our
model, since the firm would never exert effort with this initial financing.  As we show later, this outcome is
Pareto dominated by our relationship equilibrium.
13 Project B and project R that follows may have either positive or negative net present values.
14 Note that σ  is not the project return’s standard deviation; rather, it is a parameter that is positively
correlated with the firm’s risk.
15 This implies that the firm’s probability of success, p(σ ), is larger than ½.Relationship Lending and Bank Seniority
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Given this notation, our prior assumptions about the relative means and risks of
projects G, B, and R imply that
16
R B G µ µ µ = >  and  R B G σ σ σ < = . (2)
We assume that  ) ( } , min{ G G T B x I I σ µ − ≥ , so that the project’s profit when it fails is
insufficient to pay off whichever lender is senior.  This ensures that the senior lender’s
debt is never riskless, which would trivialize the role of seniority.
It is important to keep in mind that the state of the world, revealed in period 1, is
distinct from the outcome of the project, realized in period 2.  Notably, the state of the
world only helps determine the likelihood that the project will be successful.  As a result,
the firm’s project may fail even in the good state of the world and may succeed following
a recession.
Because we want to examine the role of seniority on the outcome of our model,
we will let δ  be a parameter that indicates the relative seniority of the bank.  When
1 = δ , the bank is senior, and it receives all of the firm’s liquidation value in default.  On
the other hand, when  0 = δ  the bank is junior to the trade creditor, and the trade creditor
receives the firm’s entire revenue when its project fails.  Intermediate values of δ  can be
thought of as representing varying levels of proportionate priority.  In other words, when
the firm’s project fails, the bank receives  ) ( σ µ δ − x , while the trade creditor receives
) ( ) 1 ( σ µ δ − − x .
17
Many of the results that follow depend on the idea that project R is the
consequence of risk-shifting behavior on the part of the entrepreneur.  Consistent with
this, we assume that the firm’s total expected return when the project is successful is
higher with project R than it is with project G:
18
                                                
16 Although tedious to prove, with some additional technical assumptions all of our results continue to hold
under the more general condition that  R B G µ µ µ ≥ >  and  G B R σ σ σ ≥ > .
17 The primary purpose of this specification is to facilitate the comparative statics to be performed later.
Note, however, that if δ   were equal to the proportion of the firm’s bank debt relative to its total debt, the
bank and the trade creditor implicitly would have equal priority.
18 To reduce notational requirements, we define  ) ( k k p p σ ≡  for all projects k.Relationship Lending and Bank Seniority
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) ( ) ( G G G R R R X p X p σ µ σ µ + > + . (3)
This is a standard risk-shifting assumption and it implies that, given any fixed interest
payment L, the firm will always prefer the risky project.
19
Our final assumption ensures us that project G is desirable even when additional
investment I1 is required in the bad state of the world:
B E B G c c I + ≥ − Γ − − ] ) )[( 1 ( 1 µ µ θ . (4)
Intuitively, this assumption simply tells us that the expected marginal profit from the
additional investment is sufficiently large to compensate the firm for the cost of
relationship building and the cost of effort necessary to make the good project attainable
in the bad state of the world.
3.  A Relationship Equilibrium
In this section, we use the model developed above to derive an equilibrium
consistent with the idea that bank relationships are valuable for firms.  In the first
subsection, we define a “relationship equilibrium” as one in which the bank builds a
relationship with the firm and the firm’s entrepreneur exerts effort.  We then calculate the
firm’s expected profit in this equilibrium.  In the second subsection, we derive the
conditions under which this relationship equilibrium exists.  We conclude the section by
proving our primary result that the relationship equilibrium is more likely to exist when
the bank is senior to the trade creditor.
Defining the Equilibrium
We begin by defining what we mean by a relationship equilibrium.
                                                
19 Note that this assumption does not necessarily imply that project R has a negative net present value.  This
assumption is sufficient for the results that follow to hold.  It is not necessary, however, and our results
would still hold true with weaker, albeit less-intuitive, assumptions about the relative payoffs from projects
G and R.Relationship Lending and Bank Seniority
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DEFINITION:  A Relationship Equilibrium is a sequential equilibrium in which
1)  The bank develops a relationship with the firm;
2)  The firm exerts effort if and only if it observes the bank building a
relationship;
3)  In the bad state of the world, the firm acquires additional investment from the
bank;
4)  On the out-of-equilibrium path in which the bank does not build a relationship
with the firm, it believes with probability one that the firm did not exert effort.
Note that the firm has complete information about whether the bank built a
relationship.  Instead, the only possible asymmetric information in our model arises when
the bank fails to build a relationship, in which case it does not observe whether the firm
exerted effort.  Thus, the only out-of-equilibrium beliefs that must be specified are those
of the bank for the case in which it doesn’t build a relationship.
 20
From this definition, it is clear that in any relationship equilibrium, the firm
always ends up with project G, regardless of whether the good state of the world is
realized.  As a result, the firm’s ex ante expected profits in equilibrium are
E B T G G G B T G G G c L L X p L L X p − ′ − − + − + − − + ] ) ( [ ) 1 ( ] ) ( [
* * * σ µ θ σ µ θ , (5)
where 
*
T L  and 
*
B L  are the equilibrium face values of the debt negotiated in period 0 with
the trade creditor and bank, respectively, while  B L′  is the renegotiated face value of the
debt owed to the bank after new investment in period 1.
In equilibrium, 
*
T L , 
*
B L , and  B L′  are calculated by solving the trade creditor and
bank’s zero-profit conditions.  For the trade creditor, this is
, ) ( ) 1 )( 1 (
*
T G G G T G I x p L p = − − − + σ µ δ (6)
implying that
.
) ( ) 1 )( 1 ( *
G




σ µ δ − − − −
= (7)
The intuition behind expression (6) is straightforward.  Because the firm always
ends up with project G in equilibrium, whether the good state of the world is realized is
                                                
20 As we show in Lemmas 2 and 3 below, the only set of such beliefs that are rational put probability one
on the firm not exerting effort.Relationship Lending and Bank Seniority
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irrelevant to the trade creditor.  In either state, the firm’s project succeeds with
probability  G p , in which case the trade creditor is repaid the full face value of its debt,
*
T L .  When the firm’s project fails, however, the trade creditor only receives the
proportion of the firm’s liquidation value,  ) ( G G x σ µ − , it is due given its relative priority
position,  δ − 1 .  In equilibrium, 
*
T L  is set so that this total expected return just equals the
trade creditor’s funding costs,  T I .
The bank’s zero profit condition can be written as
. ] ) ( ) 1 ( )[ 1 (                   
)] ( ) 1 ( [
1
*
B B G G G B G
G G G B G
c I I x p L p
x p L p
+ = − − − + ′ − +
− − +
σ µ δ θ
σ µ δ θ
(8)
In contrast to the trade creditor, the bank’s expected return is affected by the state of the
world, since in equilibrium the bank will provide additional financing to the firm in the
bad state, thereby renegotiating the face value of its debt.  When the good state is
realized, which happens with probability θ , there is no need for new funding and the
firm’s project succeeds with probability  G p , allowing the firm to pay 
*
B L  to the bank.
With probability  G p − 1 , however, the firm’s project fails and the bank receives its
contractual share of the firm’s liquidation value,  ) ( G G x σ µ δ − .
With probability  θ − 1  the bad state of the world occurs.  In this state, the firm
renegotiates its bank debt, promising the bank  B L′  in return for the additional funding I1.
Upon receiving this additional funding, the firm’s project once again succeeds with
probability  G p  and fails with probability  G p − 1 ; the bank’s payoff in each of these cases
is the same as it was in the good state.
The important question that remains is how the period-1 contract,  B L′ , is
negotiated.  We model this renegotiation in the following manner.  If the bad state of the
world is realized and the firm requires additional funding, the entrepreneur initiates
renegotiation by proposing a new face value of its debt to the bank in return for the added
funding I1.  The bank then has the option of either accepting or rejecting this offer.  If the
offer is rejected, the bank and the firm play a game in which each of them has a chance of
making a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the other.  With probability q, the borrower makesRelationship Lending and Bank Seniority
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the offer, while with probability  q − 1  the bank makes the offer.  In either case, if the
offer is rejected, the firm receives no additional investment and continues with the bad




We begin by considering what happens if the bank rejects the firm’s initial offer
and they proceed to the second stage of this game.  Let  B L′ ˆ  denote the new face value of
the debt proposed by the entrepreneur if he gets to make the final take-it-or-leave-it offer.
In this case, the entrepreneur will choose  B L′ ˆ  so as to drive the bank down to its
reservation return:
) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ˆ *
1 B B B B B G G G B G x p L p I x p L p σ µ δ σ µ δ − − + = − − − + ′ . (9)
If the bank rejects the entrepreneur’s offer, the firm will be left with the bad project and
its initial contract terms, 
*
B L .  Thus, the right-hand side of this equation is the lowest total
return the bank will be willing to accept.  The entrepreneur therefore sets  B L′ ˆ  so that the
bank’s expected return after providing additional funding for the good project is just
equal to this amount:
G




) )( ( ) 1 ( ˆ 1 * σ µ µ δ − − − −
+ = ′ . (10)
Similarly, let  B L′′′ ′ ~  denote the new face value of the debt proposed by the bank if it
gets to make the final offer.  In this case, the bank demands a loan payment such that the
entrepreneur will be just indifferent between accepting and rejecting the offer:
] ) ( [ ] ~ ) ( [
* * *
B T B B B B T G G G L L X p L L X p − − + = ′ − − + σ µ σ µ . (11)
In other words, the bank will set  B L′ ~  so that the firm’s profit under the good state is
exactly what it would be if no renegotiation occurred and the firm were forced to proceed
with project B.  This implies
) )( ( ~ *
G B G B B X L L σ µ µ + − + = ′ . (12)
Given these outcomes, when the entrepreneur determines its initial offer it will set
B L′  such that the bank will be just indifferent between accepting the offer and proceeding
                                                
21 Implicitly, we are assuming that the firm may not go to an outside bank for funding in this period.  This
assumption simplifies the analysis, but is not essential to our primary result.  In Section 5, we discuss how
our model would be affected by the inclusion of outside banks in this bargaining game.Relationship Lending and Bank Seniority
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to the next stage of the game
) ( ) 1 ( ] ~ ) 1 ( ˆ [ ) ( ) 1 ( G G G B B G G G G B G x p L q L q p x p L p σ µ δ σ µ δ − − + ′ − + ′ = − − + ′ , (13)
or
B B B L q L q L ′ − + ′ = ′ ~ ) 1 ( ˆ . (14)
In this expression, the parameter q effectively measures the relative bargaining strength
of the entrepreneur.  When  1 = q , the borrower retains all the surplus from the
renegotiation; if  0 = q , the bank will make the final offer and thus extracts all rents
derived from added investment in period 1.  Since the bank cannot expect to do any better
by rejecting this offer and proceeding to the final stage of bargaining, in the initial stage it
will accept the offer of  B L′  and provide an additional  1 I  in funding to the firm.
22
This  B L′  can then be substituted into the bank’s zero-profit constraint (8) to solve
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B L  is set to equal the bank’s initial funding and relationship-building costs,
less any expected recovery in default and any rents it extracts during renegotiation in
period 1, all discounted by the probability that the firm’s project will be successful.
Substituting (7), (14), and (15) into (5) shows that the firm’s equilibrium expected
profit is
] ) 1 ( [ 1
,
E B B T G
e r
i c c I I I + + − + + − Γ = Π θ µ , (16)
where r, e, and i denote the strategies of the bank and firm: build a relationship, exert
effort, and request additional investment in the bad state.  Similarly, we will use nr, ne,
and ni to denote the strategies of not building a relationship, not exerting effort, and not
requesting additional investment.  Thus we see that the firm’s expected profit in the
                                                
22 Note that  B L′′′ ′  would be exactly the same if we assumed that the bank were to make the initial offer during
renegotiation, rather than the firm.Relationship Lending and Bank Seniority
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relationship equilibrium is simply equal to the expected return on the good project, minus
the expected funding costs, and minus the relationship-building and effort costs.
Existence of the Relationship Equilibrium
Our goal in this subsection is to derive the conditions under which the relationship
equilibrium just presented exists.  We do this by developing a series of lemmas that
describe the optimal out-of-equilibrium behavior of the bank and the firm.
Consider again the game tree depicted in Figure 1.  At node 1, the bank decides
whether to build a relationship with the firm.  At nodes 2 and 3, the firm decides whether
to exert effort given the bank’s choice about whether to build a relationship.  Nature acts
at nodes 4-7, revealing the good state with probability θ  and the bad state with probability
θ − 1 .  Finally, at nodes 8-11, the firm decides whether to request added funding.  If it
does, it renegotiates its bank loan to have a new face value  B L′′′ ′ .
Essentially, our problem is to find the conditions under which the bank will build
a relationship with the firm and, given a relationship is built, the firm’s entrepreneur will
exert effort and request additional funding in the bad state of the world.  We start by
focusing on the firm’s problem at node 2 in Figure 1.  Upon observing the bank build a
relationship, the firm will be willing to follow the equilibrium strategy of exerting effort









, , , , max Π Π ≥ Π , (17)
where, as noted before, 
ne r
i
, Π  is the firm’s expected profit when the bank builds a
relationship, the firm does not exert effort, and the firm requests additional investment in
period 1, while 
ne r
ni
, Π  is the firm’s expected profit with the relationship, no effort, no
investment strategies; formal expressions for 
ne r
i
, Π  and 
ne r
ni
, Π  are derived in the
Appendix.
24  Comparing these expected returns, we can derive the conditions under
                                                
23 In the appendix, we show that when (17) holds, the firm will always choose to request additional
investment in the relationship/effort/bad state branch of the tree (node 8).
24 Throughout this section, all payoffs are derived as deviations from the relationship equilibrium.  That is,
in their derivations, 
*
T L  and 
*
B L  are defined as in (7) and (15) above, under the expectation that the firmRelationship Lending and Bank Seniority
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which the firm is willing to exert effort.
LEMMA 1:  Conditional on observing the bank build a relationship, the firm will exert
effort if and only if  } ~ , ˆ min{
*
E E E E c c c c ≡ ≤ , where











R G E ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ~ δ µ µ θ , (19)
and  ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( R R R G G G p
p x p x p w
G
R σ µ σ µ − − − − − ≡ .
Condition (17) above implies that the firm’s effort decision depends on whether it
would prefer to invest in the risky project or simply accept the bad project should the bad





, , Π > Π —i.e., the firm would prefer to not request additional investment at this node
of the tree—the entrepreneur will choose to exert effort as long as the cost of doing so is
less than  E c ˆ , his expected marginal benefit from obtaining the good project over the bad
project.
Intuitively,  E c ˆ  can be understood as follows.  The first term inside the square
brackets represents the added gross profit obtained from project G.  From this, we
subtract the added revenues that accrue to the trade creditor when the project is
unsuccessful; this is the second term in the square brackets.  The final term is the
additional investment required in order to maintain project G in the bad state of the
world.  Thus, the term in square brackets represents the net surplus that can be split
between the bank and the firm in the bad state of the world should the firm exert effort.
How much of this will be kept by the firm depends on its relative bargaining strength, q.
Finally, since effort costs must be borne in all states of the world, but their fruits are only
reaped in the bad state, this whole expression is multiplied by  θ − 1 .
Similarly, the second bound on  E c  is derived by comparing the 
e r
i




                                                                                                                                                
will exert effort and request additional funding in the bad state of the world;  B L′  is set following the rules
of the renegotiation process outlined above, given the case at hand.Relationship Lending and Bank Seniority
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Intuitively,  E c ~  represents the upper bound of costs that can be covered by the added
profit the firm earns by maintaining project G in the good state of the world, less the rents
it can extract from the trade creditor by investing in the risky project.
In this expression, w represents the additional risk-shifting revenues the firm can
earn when the trade creditor is junior.
25  In general, w may be either positive or negative,
indicating that the revenue the firm is able to extract from the trade creditor may be either
increasing or decreasing in δ .  On the one hand, choosing the risky project reduces the
firm’s total expected liquidation value below that expected by the trade creditor.  On the
other hand, the fact that project R fails more often than project G makes risk-shifting less
attractive for the firm, since the trade creditor collects these proceeds more often.  Which
of these two effects is stronger determines whether the firm finds risk shifting more or
less advantageous when the trade creditor is senior, i.e., whether w is positive or negative.
We assume that the former “risk-shifting” effect dominates the latter “default
recovery” effect, so that w > 0 and the firm can extract more revenue from the trade
creditor when it is senior.  This assumption is consistent with our earlier assumption that
the firm finds risk-shifting desirable (condition (3) above).  It is worth noting that w is
increasing in the risk of the project.  Indeed, when  x R = σ , so that project R is at its most
risky, w must be positive, implying that our assumption that w > 0 is tantamount to
assuming that project R is sufficiently risky.
Next, we consider the conditions under which the bank will build a relationship.
Obviously, whether the bank will deviate and not build a relationship depends on how the
bank expects the firm to respond to this decision.  To explore this reaction, we begin by
noting that the only distinction between the relationship and no-relationship branches of
the tree in Figure 1 is the information set comprised of nodes 10 and 11.  That is, in the
no-relationship branch the bank is unable to determine whether an entrepreneur
requesting additional funds has exerted effort, and must therefore charge the same  B L′  to
                                                
25 The total risk-shifting revenue is given by  w IT p
p
G
R ) 1 ( ) 1 ( δ − + − , where the first term in this expression
gives the risk-shifting gain the firm can obtain regardless of the trade creditor’s seniority position.Relationship Lending and Bank Seniority
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both types of firm.
This inability of the bank to ascertain the firm’s effort when there is no
relationship leads to the following lemma:
LEMMA 2:  If the bank does not build a relationship, the firm will never exert effort.
The basic idea behind this lemma is straightforward.  Although failing to exert
effort has a negative impact on the total value of the firm’s project ( G R µ µ < ), it is still
attractive to the firm as long as it can shift the downside losses to its creditors, as we
assumed by (3) above.  If the bank does not build a relationship with the firm in period 0,
the face value of its debt following new investment in period 1 cannot depend on the
firm’s effort choice, and hence provides no means of forcing the firm to internalize the
costs of this risk-shifting behavior.  Not surprisingly, this discourages the entrepreneur
from exerting effort.
It follows immediately that a bank that does not build a relationship will rationally
anticipate this behavior and charge an interest rate  B L′  commensurate with the belief that
the firm exerted no effort.
LEMMA 3:  The only consistent out-of-equilibrium beliefs for a bank that does not build a
relationship put probability 1 on the firm not exerting effort.
Given these results, the bank’s profit from deviating from our relationship
equilibrium depends only on whether the firm will choose to request added investment in
the bad state of the world, i.e., whether 
ne nr
i
, Π  is larger or smaller than 
ne nr
ni
, Π .  Since the
bank earns zero expected profit in the relationship equilibrium, the bank will only deviate
if its expected return from doing so is strictly positive.Relationship Lending and Bank Seniority
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LEMMA  4:  The bank will build a relationship with the firm if and only if
} ~ , ˆ min{
*
B B B B c c c c ≡ ≤ , where











R G B ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 )( 1 ( ~ δ µ µ θ , (21)
and once again  ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( R R R G G G p
p x p x p w
G
R σ µ σ µ − − − − − ≡ .
Casual inspection of these conditions reveals that they are virtually identical to
those on  E c  that ensured that the firm would be willing to exert effort.  The only
differences are that these restrictions apply to  B c , the bank’s cost of building a
relationship, and that the bank’s relative bargaining strength,  q − 1 , is substituted for that
of the firm.
Intuitively, this makes sense.  Just as the entrepreneur was unwilling to exert
effort unless he could capture enough of the gains from retaining the good project in the
bad state of the world to offset his effort cost, so the bank will be unwilling to build a
relationship unless it expects to capture sufficient rents upon renegotiation in period 1 to
compensate it for the cost of doing so.  Since the benefits from maintaining the good
project are the same regardless of which party captures them, the only question is how
they are split between the firm and the bank, as measured by the bargaining strength
parameter q.
Putting together Lemmas 1-4 gives us the conditions under which a relationship
equilibrium exists.
PROPOSITION 1:  A relationship equilibrium exists as long as the firm’s cost of exerting
effort and the bank’s cost of building a relationship are not too large, i.e., if
*
E E c c ≤  and 
*
B B c c ≤ .
As one would expect, the intuition behind this proposition mirrors that behind
Lemmas 1 and 4.  Building a relationship is costly for the bank, as is exerting effort for
the firm’s entrepreneur.  Unless both the bank and firm can capture sufficient rents duringRelationship Lending and Bank Seniority
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renegotiation in period 1, one or both will be unwilling to fulfill its obligation and the
relationship equilibrium will break down.
An interesting consequence of this proposition is that if either the bank or the firm
have all the bargaining strength during renegotiation in period 1—i.e., if  0 = q  or  1 = q —
a relationship equilibrium will never exist whenever relationship building and effort costs
are strictly positive.  We discuss this and other implications of the bank and firm’s
relative bargaining strengths in Section 5.
Relationship Lending and Bank Seniority
In the last subsection, we defined and characterized a relationship equilibrium in
which the bank builds a relationship with the firm and the firm’s entrepreneur exerts
effort in its project after observing the bank build this relationship.  Our task now is to
analyze how the bank’s relative seniority position affects the conditions under which this
relationship equilibrium exists.
PROPOSITION  2:  A relationship equilibrium exists for a larger set of exogenous
relationship-building and effort costs when the bank is senior.
Figure 3 illustrates the effects of this proposition.  In this figure, the diagonal line
represents the set of  ) , ( E B c c  pairs for which (4) above is satisfied.  Recall that,
intuitively, this condition required that project G’s expected return be sufficiently large
compared to that of project B to justify the costs of building a relationship and exerting
effort, as well as any additional investment that is required during a recession.  Thus, the
area below this diagonal line exhausts the set of  ) , ( E B c c  pairs for which a relationship
equilibrium would be a desirable outcome.
As shown in the previous section, the bank will only be willing to build a
relationship if 
*
B B c c ≤  and, upon observing the bank build a relationship, the firm will
only be willing to exert effort if 
*
E E c c ≤ .  Thus, the shaded region in Figure 3 gives the
feasible ) , ( E B c c  pairs for which both the bank and the firm can commit to theRelationship Lending and Bank Seniority
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relationship equilibrium.  For larger relationship building or effort costs, either the bank
or firm will deviate and the relationship equilibrium will fail to exist.
Proposition 2, then, is proven by demonstrating that both of these restrictions
become less binding as the bank’s relative seniority position increases.  That is, as δ
increases, the bank and the firm can incur higher costs of building a relationship and




E B c c +  measures the net benefit to be divided between the bank and
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As discussed in the last subsection, this represents the higher expected return associated
with the good project, minus the required added investment and the fraction of this higher
expected return that will accrue to the trade creditor should the project fail in period 2.
When the trade creditor is junior, it retains less of the benefit from maintaining the good
project in the bad state of the world.  As a result, there is more left to be divided between
the bank and firm, and higher relationship building and effort costs can be supported.
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upon renegotiation in period 1.  In this expression, investing in project R has the added
benefit of shifting risk onto the trade creditor.  The rents from this risk shifting are
subtracted from the higher expected total return associated with project G to come up
with the total amount to be divided between the bank and trade creditor.
Since w > 0, expression (23) is an increasing function of δ .  Intuitively, as the
bank’s relative seniority position increases, the trade creditor becomes less exposed toRelationship Lending and Bank Seniority
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this risk shifting.  As a result, the bank and firm have a larger pie to split between
themselves upon renegotiation in period 1.  Once again, this allows them to incur higher
relationship building and effort costs and still commit to the relationship equilibrium.
Thus we see that a relationship equilibrium is more likely to exist when the bank
is made senior to the firm’s other creditors.  Of course, this result would be of little
interest if our relationship equilibrium were dominated by other possible equilibria in our
model.  In the next section, we show this is not the case.
4.  Alternative Equilibria and Efficiency
In the previous section, we defined and characterized an equilibrium in which the
bank builds a relationship with the firm and the entrepreneur exerts effort.  In addition,
we demonstrated that this relationship equilibrium is exists for a larger set of exogenous
parameters when the bank is made senior over the firm’s trade creditor.
Now, we extend the analysis to consider other potential equilibria.  In particular,
we demonstrate that the relationship equilibrium described above Pareto dominates the
most natural alternative, a “no-relationship” equilibrium.  As a result, there is a
measurable welfare loss when the bank and/or firm are unable to commit to their
relationship equilibrium strategies.
Given the discussion in Section 3, it should not be surprising that the relationship
equilibrium described there is not unique.  In particular, a no-relationship equilibrium
may also exist.
DEFINITION:  A No-Relationship Equilibrium is a sequential equilibrium in which
1)  The bank does not develop a relationship with the firm; and
2)  The firm does not exert effort.
Strictly speaking, two such no-relationship equilibria may exist—one in which the firm
requests additional investment in the bad state of the world and one in which it does not.
For the purposes of our analysis, both of these outcomes are qualitatively similar, in theRelationship Lending and Bank Seniority
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sense that the bank does not build a relationship with the firm, so we will treat them as
one equilibrium.
26
The key difference between this no-relationship equilibrium and the deviations
from the relationship equilibrium described in the previous section is the underlying
beliefs.  In the no-relationship equilibrium, the bank and the trade creditor both price their
initial period-0 debt contracts under the belief that no relationship will be built and that
the firm will not exert effort.  In contrast, the deviations in the last section were derived
under the assumption that the bank would build a relationship and that the firm would
exert effort.  Given the differing beliefs that underlie the relationship and no-relationship
equilibria, it is feasible that both may exist for the same set of exogenous parameters.
27
In other words, our model may exhibit multiple equilibria; we discuss the issue of
equilibrium selection in a moment.
In addition to the no-relationship equilibrium, there are three other potential
equilibria that one might wish to consider.  The first is an autarkic equilibrium, in which
no lending occurs.  The second is an equilibrium in which the bank does not build a
relationship with the firm, but the firm nevertheless exerts effort; Lemma 2, however,
implies that this can never be an equilibrium.  The final possible equilibrium is a “no-
effort” equilibrium in which the bank builds a relationship with the firm, but the firm
chooses to not exert effort.  Although it is possible that these strategies can be supported
as an equilibrium for some set of beliefs, they will always be dominated by the no-
relationship equilibrium just defined.
The question we ask, then, is under which of these potential equilibria is the firm
better off.  That is, when the relationship equilibrium fails to exist, is there a social loss
that results from the inability to commit to building a relationship and exerting effort?
                                                
26 Furthermore, the bank may have a variety of beliefs about the firm’s out-of-equilibrium effort choice,
giving rise to other possible no-relationship equilibria that satisfy the above definition.
27 In fact, we have been able to demonstrate the simultaneous existence of these equilibria by means of a
numerical example; this example is omitted from the text for the sake of brevity.Relationship Lending and Bank Seniority
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PROPOSITION 3:  The firm’s expected profit, and hence social welfare, is higher under the
strategies associated with the relationship equilibrium than it is under the
strategies associated with any other equilibrium.
It is important to note that this result is not dependent on the existence of any
particular equilibrium.  As a result, there is a tangible welfare loss associated with the
breakdown of the relationship equilibrium.  In other words, for any  ) , ( E B c c  pair that
satisfies (4) but for which the relationship equilibrium does not exist, firm profit—and
hence social welfare—would be higher if the bank and the firm could commit to their
relationship equilibrium strategies.
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is reasonably straightforward.  When the
relationship equilibrium breaks down, either because 
*
B B c c >  or 
*
E E c c > , either the
autarkic, the no-relationship, or the no-effort equilibrium results.  In these equilibria,
however, the firm ends up with either project B or project R should the bad state of the
world occur.  Condition (4) above thus ensures that the relationship equilibrium
dominates each of these alternatives, because  R B G µ µ µ = > .  That is, the firm’s expected
profits are always higher under the relationship equilibrium than they are under any of the
other possible outcomes.
When combined with Proposition 2, Proposition 3 provides a strong justification
for giving the bank seniority over the firm’s trade creditors.  By making the bank senior,
the bank and the firm are more readily able to commit to their relationship equilibrium
strategies, thus minimizing the likelihood of less-desirable outcomes such as the no-
relationship equilibrium and autarky occurring.  Thus, it is clear that bank seniority can
play an important role in encouraging the formation of valuable bank-firm relationships.
As mentioned above, each of the possible equilibria in our model may exist for
the same set of exogenous parameters.  Nevertheless, the usual problem of determining
which equilibrium will obtain is not present.  First, as demonstrated in Proposition 3, the
relationship equilibrium Pareto dominates any other equilibrium that may exist, providing
a natural focal point for selecting this equilibrium.  More importantly, the specificRelationship Lending and Bank Seniority
25
equilibrium to be reached is an implicit part of the initial loan contract between the bank
and the firm.  As a result, competition among banks will ensure that if multiple equilibria
do exist, the firm will be offered a contract that affords it the highest possible profit; i.e.,
the relationship equilibrium.
5.  Renegotiation and Inter-Period Subsidization
In this section, we discuss further implications of the bargaining that occurs upon
realization of the bad state in period 1.  In particular, we analyze how the structure of this
renegotiation game can affect the likelihood that a relationship equilibrium will exist.  In
addition, we consider how modifications to this bargaining process might affect our
primary result that bank seniority promotes the formation of valuable bank-firm
relationships.
Renegotiation and Outside Banks
Implicit in our model is the assumption that the firm is unable to approach outside
banks for supplemental funding when the bad state of the world is revealed.  As it turns
out, relaxing this assumption would not affect our results in any qualitative manner.
Most importantly, our conclusion that a relationship equilibrium is more likely to exist
when the bank is senior continues to hold even when the firm can approach outside banks
for supplemental funding during period 1.
To understand this fact, consider how the renegotiation game described above
would be changed if the firm could approach outside banks for funding in period 1.  As
before, assume that the firm is given the opportunity to make an initial offer to the inside
bank.  If the bank rejects this initial  B L′ , the firm may choose between going to an outside
bank for funding or playing the second stage of the renegotiation game as described in
Section 3.
Under these rules, the primary effect of allowing the firm to approach outside
banks for funding in period 1 is to limit the amount of surplus the bank can extract during
the negotiation by increasing the firm’s relative bargaining position, q.  In other words,Relationship Lending and Bank Seniority
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because the firm now has the option of paying off the original bank with the proceeds of
a loan from a new bank, it will never offer an  B L′  that is higher than the one it would
receive from an outside bank.
28  As a result, the firm retains a (weakly) larger fraction of
the rents from renegotiation than it would if there were no outside banks.
Although the relative bargaining positions of the firm and the bank are altered by
the presence of outside lenders, the basic intuition behind Proposition 2 remains
unchanged.  Once again, in the bad state the bank and the firm must negotiate over the
net added revenues associated with the good project less the fraction that accrues to the
trade creditor when the firm defaults.  While the presence of outside banks may affect
how this “pie” is divided between the bank and the firm, its overall size is not.
Regardless of the rules of the renegotiation game in period 1, therefore, bank seniority is
the key factor in maximizing the rents that ensure the existence of a relationship
equilibrium.
This is not to imply that the outside banks have no impact on outcomes in our
model.  In fact, the firm’s ability to approach outside lenders for funding in period 1 may
so strengthen its bargaining position that the relationship equilibrium breaks down, even
when the inside bank is senior to the firm’s trade creditors.  To see this, consider the
extreme situation in which outside banks are fully informed about the firm’s effort
decision.  In this case, the firm enjoys a perfectly competitive market when it renegotiates
its period-1 debt.  But this effectively implies that  1 = q  so that  0
* = B c , and the bank will
never be willing to build a relationship with the firm, even when  1 = δ .
Of course, it is unreasonable to suppose that outside lenders have the same access
to information about the firm’s prospects as does the inside bank.  As a result, q will
likely be less than 1.  Nevertheless, it is still possible that competitive pressures in period
1 may limit the bank’s ability to cover its relationship-building costs, thereby breaking
                                                
28 Our assumption that original bank’s debt is repaid is motivated by the observation that bank loan
agreements commonly include covenants prohibiting the firm from obtaining additional debt without the
bank’s prior approval.Relationship Lending and Bank Seniority
27
down the relationship equilibrium.
The natural question, then, is how the firm and the bank might alter their relative
bargaining positions so as to ensure that a relationship equilibrium will exist.  It is to this
question that we turn next.
The Relative Bargaining Strengths of the Bank and Firm
Casual observation of the restrictions 
*
B c  and 
*
E c  reveals that the relative
bargaining strengths of the bank and the firm play a crucial role in the existence of our
relationship equilibrium. Thus far, we have treated the bargaining-strength parameter, q,
as if it were exogenous.  Given q, we can calculate 
*
B c  and 
*
E c ; if either the cost of
building a relationship or the cost of exerting effort exceeds its respective bound, a
relationship equilibrium will fail to exist.
More generally, however, we can imagine that the bank and the firm may be able
to write terms into their debt agreement that can affect their relative bargaining strengths
should the bad state of the world occur in period 1.  For example, many bank loan
agreements contain covenants that prohibit the firm from obtaining outside funding
without approval from the bank.  Such a covenant has the effect of strengthening the
bank’s bargaining position should its debt agreement be renegotiated.  Similarly, early
cancellation penalties, compensating balance requirements, and confidentiality
agreements all act to restrict the firm’s ability to act independently of the bank, and thus
reduce its leverage when renegotiating the terms of the initial debt agreement.
This suggests that the bank and firm can effectively choose q so as to ensure that a
relationship equilibrium will exist for a wider range of  ) , ( E B c c  combinations.  For
example, consider the situation outlined in Figure 4.  In panel A, the bank’s cost of
building a relationship exceeds 
*
B c , implying that the bank cannot credibly commit to
building a relationship.  As a result, the relationship equilibrium breaks down.  Suppose
now that the bank and firm incorporate covenants in their period-0 debt contract that
effectively increase the bank’s relative bargaining power in period 1; i.e., decrease q.Relationship Lending and Bank Seniority
28
The end result of these covenants is to shift up 
*
B c  and lower 
*
E c  so that the given  ) , ( E B c c
pair support a relationship equilibrium (see panel B).
By choosing q to ensure a relationship equilibrium exists, the bank and firm are
effectively transferring bank profits from the period-0 contract, 
*
B L , to the period-1
contract,  B L′ .  In other words, the optimal debt contract in our model generally involves
an element of cross-period subsidization.
This cross-period subsidization gives us an alternative interpretation of the events
depicted in Figure 4.  In panel A, the bank’s costs of building a relationship are so large
that it must set 
*
B L  very high to ensure it earns its required return.  At this high rate of
interest, however, the bank will have a strong incentive to deviate by not building a
relationship with the firm; at worst, the firm will choose not to request additional funding
in period 1, and the bank will keep its high-rate contract, 
*
B L .  If the bank can instead
write covenants into its debt agreement that increase its period-1 bargaining strength, the
rents it earns in  B L′  can be used to offset losses from 
*
B L .  This inter-period subsidization
allows the bank to commit to the relationship equilibrium, even in the presence of a very
high  B c .
Thus, our model provides a formal rationalization for the empirical results of
Berger and Udell (1992), Peterson and Rajan (1995), and Berlin and Mester (1999), who
collectively find that banks smooth loan rates over the life of their relationships with
firms.  In short, relationship lenders in our model are able to provide young firms with
below-market financing through the rents received later in the relationship.
6.  Empirical Implications
Our analysis provides a number of implications that may be tested empirically.
As discussed in the last section, inter-period subsidization pays an important role in our
model, allowing the bank to bear larger initial relationship-building costs and still
credibly commit to performing this valuable service.  In particular, the bank may use
covenants and other contractual provisions to increase its bargaining position later in theRelationship Lending and Bank Seniority
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firm’s life, thereby ensuring the existence of a relationship equilibrium.
IMPLICATION 1:  Firms that are more costly to monitor—e.g., younger firms and those
with more intangible assets—will tend to include more restrictive covenants in
their loan agreements and be more likely to use senior bank debt to fund their
operations.
Young firms and those with very intangible assets tend to be more informationally
opaque.  Similarly, firms that have very unique products or are otherwise atypical in their
industry can be difficult for lenders to evaluate.  As a result,  B c  will tend to be higher for
such firms, and more restrictive loan agreements will be necessary to ensure that a
relationship equilibrium exists.  
IMPLICATION 2:  Firms with more risk-shifting opportunities—e.g., those with more liquid
assets or more growth opportunities—are more likely to use senior bank debt to
fund their operations.
Firms with very liquid assets tend to require more intensive monitoring by the
bank, to ensure that these assets are not improperly diverted.  Similarly, firms with
relatively little current revenue but strong growth prospects will require more intensive
monitoring by their banks.  Because bank monitoring of such firms is so important, they
will tend to use more senior bank debt to facilitate the formation of ongoing relationships.
IMPLICATION 3:  The duration of exclusive bank relationships is likely to be longer for
young firms, those with more intangible assets, and those with more risk-shifting
opportunities.  Such firms are also more likely to exhibit cross-subsidization in
their loan rates over the life of their banking relationships.
In contrast, firms with more transparent operations or with more established
reputations will find it relatively easier to obtain funding from outside lenders during
times of economic stress.  As a result, firms like these should exhibit less variation in
their funding rates over time, the duration of their bank relationships should be shorter,
and they should be less likely to incorporate subordination clauses in their non-bank debtRelationship Lending and Bank Seniority
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agreements.
IMPLICATION 4:  Firms with ongoing bank relationships will be less likely to face credit
constraints during recessions and other times of bank capital decline.
Williams Stanton (1998) shows that bank lending is subject to leveraged-induced
under-investment problems, which can result in a restriction in the supply of credit during
recessions and other system-wide declines in bank capital.  Our model suggests that the
brunt of such reductions in bank lending will be borne by firms that do not have ongoing
bank relationships.  In the language of Boot and Thakor (forthcoming), when banks face
a weakening of their balance sheets, they respond by reducing their transaction lending,
not their relationship lending.
IMPLICATION  5:  Bank seniority should be more prevalent for relationship than for
transaction loans.
When banks make transaction, or arms-length, loans, they provide no special
monitoring services.  As a result, there is less need for such bank loans to contain
seniority covenants.  In contrast, our model has shown that relationship lending is
facilitated by the use of seniority.  One piece of anecdotal evidence consistent with this
implication is the fact that “shotgun” small-business loan offers—those that are sent out
via mass mailings similar to credit card offers—do not typically contain seniority
provisions.
7.  Concluding Thoughts
In this paper, we have shown how bank seniority facilitates the formation of
ongoing relationships between banks and their small-business borrowers.
29  In our model,
bank relationships are valuable in that they allow the bank to distinguish between good
                                                
29 More specifically, our model suggests that banks will be senior in their relationship loans with small-
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and bad firms in times of economic distress.  As a result, firms with bank relationships
are more willing to exert the effort necessary to ensure the quality of their projects.  Our
central insight is that this desirable relationship-lending equilibrium is more likely to
exist when the bank is senior to the firm’s other creditors.
One way of understanding this comes from recognizing that a failure to exert
effort is, in essence, risk-shifting behavior by the firm.  When the bank is senior, not only
does it have a better incentive to build a relationship with the firm, it also forces the firm
to internalize more of the effects of its risk-shifting behavior when it asks for additional
financing during a recession.  In contrast, the junior bank has less incentive to control the
firm, because it is less affected by this behavior.
In an ideal world, the bank and firm would write a long-term contract fully
specifying the actions of each and the terms of any supplemental funding to be provided
in period 1.  In essence, bank seniority provides a means of committing to the actions
outlined in this first-best contract when such a contract cannot be written and enforced.
Our conclusion that banks should be senior stands in contrast to the typical view
that junior lenders have a better incentive to control firm risk-shifting, since they are the
first to suffer when the firm’s prospects diminish.  Although this is a common view, our
model demonstrates that it is not always correct.
More generally, the proper priority for a “monitoring” lender depends on how the
monitoring will affect that lender’s payoff given the firm’s underlying financial
condition.
30  In our model, it is the senior lender that benefits from maintaining the good
project in the bad state of the world.  By making its loan senior to those of the firm’s
other creditors, the bank is able to reap the benefits of its relationship building, and thus
is willing to incur the incumbent costs of this action.
This role for bank seniority in our model is similar in some respects to that of
secured debt in Stulz and Johnson (1985).  In that paper, secured debt is used to mitigate
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the under-investment problem that can arise when the firm cannot renegotiate its existing
debt in the face of new investment opportunities.
31  Like the secured debt in Stulz and
Johnson, bank seniority in our model guarantees that future investment decisions are not
distorted by the presence of existing creditors.  Unlike this earlier work, however, bank
seniority serves as a commitment device to ensure that the firm will exert effort, thereby
creating a low-risk marginal investment should the bad state of the world occur.
Another important characteristic often ascribed to relationship lenders is the
ability to cross-subsidize the firm early in its life with rents the bank earns on later
contracts with the firm.  Such inter-period subsidization plays an important role in our
model, allowing the bank to bear larger initial relationship-building costs and still
credibly commit to performing this valuable service.  In particular, the bank may use
covenants and other contractual provisions to increase its bargaining position later in the
firm’s life, thereby ensuring the existence of a relationship equilibrium.
Like all theoretical models, our analysis must be considered with certain caveats.
As discussed in Section 3, the maximum costs of building a relationship and exerting
effort that can support a relationship equilibrium depend on the additional risk-shifting
revenues the firm can extract from the trade creditor when it is junior.  These revenues
are measured by the term w, which we assumed to be positive.  Intuitively, by assuming
that  w > 0, we assume that additional investment in the no-effort firm makes its follow-
up project substantially more risky. Although we believe this is the most natural
assumption to make, if w were negative, the impact of seniority on the existence of a
relationship equilibrium could become non-monotonic.  In other words, if by failing to
exert effort the firm has little impact on the riskiness of its project, then in some cases a
relationship equilibrium may be facilitated by making the bank junior to the firm’s other
creditors.
32
This consideration of the role of risk shifting points out another central
                                                
31 James (1988) uses a similar idea to motivate bank loan sales and standby letters of credit.
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assumption underlying our analysis.  Recall that additional investment in the firm during
a recession has a different impact in our model, depending on whether the entrepreneur
exerted effort.  If the entrepreneur exerted effort, then additional investment merely
serves to preserve the firm’s high-return, low-risk status.  On the other hand, if the
entrepreneur did not exert effort, then additional investment acts to increase the risk of
the firm’s project, without raising its expected return.  Clearly, if this assumption were
altered, our conclusions about the optimality of bank seniority would be affected.
Rather than being a weakness, however, we believe this fact serves to highlight
the importance of risk shifting for relationship lending; if the firm’s entrepreneur does not
continuously work to improve his firm’s business prospects, then added funding is
unlikely to revive the firm during a recession.  It is the exactly this type of risk-shifting
behavior that banks monitor on their relationship loans, and it is this type of behavior that
makes bank seniority optimal in our model.
Finally, note that we have assumed that building a relationship with the firm is a
costly endeavor for the bank.  If this were not the case, the relative seniority of the bank
would have no impact on the existence of our relationship equilibrium; because doing so
is costless and beneficial to the firm, the bank would always build a relationship.
Nevertheless, we believe the more natural case is the one in which initiating and
maintaining an ongoing relationship with the firm is costly for the bank.
8.  Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1:  
e r
i
, Π  is given by (16) in the text.  As discussed in the text, there are
two cases to consider.
Case A: Firm Does Not Request Added Investment – Upon observing the bank
build a relationship, if the firm chooses to not exert effort and not request added
investment in the bad state of the world, its expected return isRelationship Lending and Bank Seniority
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Recalling that  ) )( 1 ( ) ( G G G G x p X p σ σ − − + + = Γ , this constraint can be rewritten as  E c ˆ
in the text.
Case B:  Firm Requests Added Investment – In the same manner, we can derive
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These definitions for  B L′ ˆ  and  B L′ ~  are analogous to those presented in the text, and
represent the minimum renegotiation offers acceptable to the bank and firm, respectively,
upon reaching the relationship, no-effort, bad-state branch of the game tree (node 9).
Using these definitions, we can rewrite
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where  ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( R R R G G G p
p x p x p w
G
R σ µ σ µ − − − − − ≡  as in the text.  The intuition
behind this expression is as follows.  If the firm chooses to invest in the risky project in





, , Π > Π —its profit differs from that in the
relationship equilibrium in two ways.  First, it does not bear the effort costs  E c  borne in
the relationship equilibrium.  Second, by investing in project R in the bad state, the firm
is able to shift risk onto the trade creditor; this effect is given by the first two terms in the
square brackets.  This gain, however, is offset by the lower expected return associated
with the risky project, measured by the third term in the square brackets.  These effectsRelationship Lending and Bank Seniority
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from investing in the risky project are only realized in the bad state of the world, so this
whole expression is multiplied by  θ − 1 .  Finally, how much of these rents the firm is able




, Π  gives  E c ~  as defined in the text.
Next, we must show that the proper  E c  restriction is binding given the firm’s
incentives to request or not request additional investment at node 9 of the game tree.
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effort building costs for the relationship equilibrium to exist.
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Using this, it is straightforward to calculate
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Note, however, that this difference is equal to  E c ˆ .  Thus, whenever the firm has an
incentive to exert effort— E E c c ˆ 0 ≤ < —it will have an incentive to ask for additional
funding in the relationship, effort, bad state branch of the tree (node 8 in Figure 1).  ♠
Proof of Lemma 2:  Let LB and LT denote any arbitrary initial face values of the debt
owed to the bank and the trade creditor, respectively.  Given this debt and the bank’s
decision to not build a relationship with the firm, let 
e
i π  and 
ne
i π  denote the firm’s
expected return from exerting effort and not exerting effort, respectively, when it will
request additional investment in the bad state of the world, and let 
e
ni π  and 
ne
ni π  denote
these expected returns when the firm will not request this added investment.  Note that
these expected returns are for any arbitrary values of  B L  and  T L , and are thus distinct
from the expressions 
e r
i
, Π , etc.  When the firm does not request additional investment in
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costly for the firm; i.e.,  0 > E c .  On the other hand, if the firm does request added
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In other words, when the bank does not build a relationship, the firm’s optimal response
is to not exert effort.  ♠
Proof of Lemma 3:  Immediate from Lemma 2 and the discussion in the text.  ♠
Proof of Lemma 4:  The bank’s expected return from deviating and not building a
relationship with the firm depends on whether or not the firm’s optimal out-of-
equilibrium behavior is to request additional investment in the no-relationship, no-effort,
bad-state branch of the tree (node 11 in Figure 1).  We consider each of the relevant cases
in turn.
Case A: Firm Does Not Request Added Investment – In this case, the bank’s
expected return from deviating an not building a relationship is
B B B B B B G G G B G I x p L p x p L p − − − + − + − − + )] ( ) 1 ( )[ 1 ( )] ( ) 1 ( [
* * σ µ δ θ σ µ δ θ . (33)
Substituting in the equilibrium value of 
*
B L  from (15) above, this simplifies to
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Since the bank’s equilibrium expected return is zero, the bank will want to deviate and
not build a relationship in this case if
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Case B:  Firm Requests Added Investment – Here, the bank’s expected return
from not building a relationship is
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where  B L′′  is the face value of the renegotiated bank debt when the firm requests
additional funding to invest in the risky project; this is derived in a manner analogous toRelationship Lending and Bank Seniority
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that used to derive  B L′ .  Thus,
B B B L q L q L ′′ − + ′′ = ′′ ~ ) 1 ( ˆ , (37)
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Substituting (37) into (36) and noting that the bank’s earns zero expected profit in the
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G
R σ µ σ µ − − − − − ≡ .  This gives us the second
condition given in the lemma.  ♠
Proof of Proposition 1:  Immediate from Lemmas 1–4.  ♠
Proof of Proposition 2:  Immediate from the differentiation of  E c ˆ ,  E c ~ ,  B c ˆ  and  B c ~  with
respect to δ .  ♠
Proof of Proposition 3:  If the relationship equilibrium does not exist, there are only three
other potential outcomes.  The first is an autarkic equilibrium in which no lending occurs.
The firm’s expected profit in this equilibrium is 0, which is less than 
e r
i
, Π  by assumption.
The second possible outcome is the no-relationship equilibrium.  Letting “bars”
denote values associated with the no-relationship equilibrium, it is straightforward to
show that
T B B G
ne nr
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In other words, the firm’s profit in the no-relationship equilibrium is equal to the
expected revenue from the project minus the required investment costs.  Given that
R B µ µ =  and investing in project R in period 1 entails additional expected funding costs
of  1 ) 1 ( I θ − , it is clear that the firm’s expected profit in the no relationship equilibrium




Comparing the firm’s expected profit in the no-relationship equilibrium with





, , Π − Π ), we see that the relationship
equilibrium dominates whenever
E B B G c c I + > − Γ − − ] ) )[( 1 ( 1 µ µ θ . (43)
This, however, is simply condition (4) in the text.
The last possible outcome is the no-effort equilibrium in which the bank builds a
relationship with but the firm nonetheless chooses to not exert effort.  Since the end
project choices in each of the states of the world are the same under this equilibrium as
they are under the no-relationship equilibrium, the fact that relationship building is costly
means that the firm’s profit is higher in the no-relationship equilibrium, and hence the
relationship equilibrium, than it is in the no-effort equilibrium.  ♠Relationship Lending and Bank Seniority
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Figure 2
Effect of an increase in risk on the distribution of project returns.
An increase in the risk of the project from  1 σ  to  2 σ  has two effects.  First,
it lowers the likelihood that the project is successful, from  ) ( 1 σ p  to
) ( 2 σ p .  Second, it increases the project’s payoff to  2 σ + X  when
successful and decreases its payoff to  2 σ − x when unsuccessful.
) ( 1 σ p
) ( 2 σ p
) ( 1 2 σ p −
) ( 1 1 σ p −
2 σ − x 1 σ − x 1 σ + X 2 σ + XRelationship Lending and Bank Seniority
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Figure 3
Effect of an increase in bank seniority (δ ).
In this figure, the shaded region represents the area in which a relationship
equilibrium exists.  The dotted region gives the  ) , ( E B c c  pairs for which
either the firm is unable to commit to exerting effort or the bank is unable
to commit to building a relationship.  In either event, the relationship
equilibrium breaks down.  Because w > 0, both 
*
B c  and 
*
E c  are increasing
in δ .  As a result, a relationship equilibrium is more likely to exist when





























Effect of a decrease in q.
In this figure, the bank’s bargaining position is sufficiently poor that it is
unable to commit to building a relationship given its cost of doing so,  B c .
As a result, the relationship equilibrium breaks down.  If the firm and bank
can write terms into their contract that increase the bank’s relative
bargaining strength (decrease q), however, 
*
B c  will shift up and 
*
E c  shift
down so that the given  ) , ( E B c c  pair does fall within the relationship
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